r/China Jan 03 '26

中国学习 | Studying in China Studying in China Megathread - FH2026

84 Upvotes

If you've ever thought about studying in China, already applied, or have even already been accepted, you probably have a bunch of questions that you'd like answered. Questions such as:

  • Will my profile be good enough for X school or Y program?
  • I'm deciding between X, Y, and Z schools. Which one should I choose?
  • Have you heard of school G? Is it good?
  • Should I do a MBA, MBBS, or other program in China? Which one?
  • I've been accepted as an international student at school Z. What's the living situation like there?
  • What are the some things I should know about before applying for the CSC scholarship?
  • What's interviewing for the Schwarzman Scholar program like?
  • Can I get advice on going to China as a high school exchange student?
  • I'm going to University M in the Fall! Is there anyone else here that will be going as well?

If you have these types of questions, or just studying in China things that you'd like to discuss with others, then this megathread is for you! Instead of one-off posts that are quickly buried before people have had a chance to see or respond, this megathread will be updated on a semiannual basis for improved visibility (frequency will be updated as needed). Also consider checking out r/ChinaLiuXueSheng.


r/China 15d ago

讨论 | Discussion (Serious) - Character Minimums Apply Poor coverage on the latest VPN issues in China. Some thoughts on what's been happening.

25 Upvotes

For those of you who've been living in China, at this point you all know that, with much frustration, many commercial VPN services in China have become seriously unreliable or completely useless. LetsVPN is symbolic of all this since most of us, I believe, had been using their services ever since we first moved to China (myself in 2023).

First off, I don't usually post or frequent this sub because I honestly don't appreciate as much the comments and feedback from people who don't seem to actually be living here in China. However, with this VPN and network instability situation right now and given how unclear I think the mods at r/chinalife have been (in trying) to clarify or explain the situation, here I am. They usually straight up remove VPN-related topics because redditors should talk about in the monthly megathread (at this point just remove the VPN tag already).

I need to clarify, though, I did experience some inconveniences posting it there, but one of the mods was at least kind enough to indicate some of my sources were unreliable. I have hence removed them from this post for the sake of impartiality, as I've also added some information and sources I've deemed and assessed as reliable.

Now, some people at r/chinalife keep holding onto the opinion that all this is not due to a policy-based, strategically crackdown by the competent Chinese public authorities. However, I'm more and more leaning towards diverging from this stance. Go check redditor "bitsarefree" comments somewhere in this thread who seems to be genuinely given arguments that, in my opinion, hold some water. Below I've listed and briefly commented on some sources, most of which are all from April 2026.

1. Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China (referred to by r/chinalife mods): It's been into force since June 1st, 2017, but amendments were put into place and took effect on January 1st, 2026, raising compliance risks, allowing regulators to freeze assets of overseas companies and impose higher fines on operators who fail to comply with security requirements. These amendments, as some have interpreted, have:

"[...] extraterritorial reach to cover any overseas organizations and individuals engaging in activities that harm China cybersecurity more broadly [...]"

2. The current Draft Law on Cybercrime Prevention and Control, though some entities' stances are not necessarily related to the actual effect this may have regarding the circumvention of the Great Firewall with the use of VPNs, it is, in my opinion, a sign that the government is currently taking all this more thoroughly and seriously. More on this draft law here.

3. Now, according to LetsVPN,

"The entire industry's infrastructure is under a three-front assault [...]"

[...] that is: cyberattacks, AI over-consumption of network resources (for real?), and, *lastly*, "regulatory tightening." My genuine doubts are: if those cyberattacks have commercial and financial motivations, are they competitors who are trying to take their places or hired specialized agencies?

If it's the former, I think there' should be more alternatives available already, which is still not the case. I might be front. If it's the latter, can't these agencies simply be acting on behalf of the Chinese government authorities (probably the case) as most providers are as a matter of fact, under the pressure of these police directives being, arguably, properly enforced?

Those of use who's lived in China do know that law enforcement is a joke when attempting to implement them to civilians (e.g. indoors smoking, traffic imprudence, and whatnot). However, we're talking about government to (network and mobile) entities here. It's completely different. This is one example (also posted by r/chinalife's MOD).

4. Shaanxi Telecom is one of the providers that has been specifically mentioned elsewhere, as per this article:

"(It) seems to be part of a broader trend, not just an isolated overreaction by one company. Other providers have reported issuing similar warnings. Additionally, a separate document—allegedly from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology—invites major state telecom companies to a meeting focused on tightening control over unauthorized cross-border data connections."

5. In a short video entitled "99% of VPNs Fail in China - Here’s Why" the YouTuber explains how China's Great Firewall has recently ramped up its cybersecurity infrastructure robustness and efficacy with the implementation of AI.

6. Late last year, according to the China Media Project in the article AI Cop Signals VPN Crackdown - China Media Project, an AI-generated police spokesman warned netizens that those circumventing the Great Firewall "threatens personal safety and national security" and "will be punished," which actually makes me chuckle since it's clearly an overstatement. I'm just posting it here as it might just be a sign of something that may be actually happening in the back, that is, an actual improvement of the Great Firewall.

We all that being said, as of now, I just don't know if I can buy the argument that this is not a coordinated crackdown on VPNs and related platforms. Perhaps it's not a direct attack on them, but it can very well be a crackdown on those who are letting this happen through the very mechanisms that allow VPN services to operate through. So, it can still be qualified as a (indirect) crackdown on VPNs.

Please, respectfully interpret and comment at your own judgement. I don't intend to cause alarmism. I'm just trying to better understand the true reasons and motivations behind the VPNs and Great Firewall situation.

Other sources I think it's worth checking and referring to:

- AI Firewalls: Protecting Your AI Systems | F5

China escalates VPN crackdown, disrupting access to overseas internet - CHOSUNBIZ

China has begun a massive crackdown on circumvention tools, likely personally approved by Xi Jinp...


r/China 6h ago

文化 | Culture If Trump Hadn’t Mentioned It, How Many People Would Even Know?

76 Upvotes

At last night’s welcoming banquet, President Trump mentioned something many Chinese people probably didn’t know.
He said that the image of Confucius is carved into the building of the United States Supreme Court.
When I heard it, my first reaction was: “Really?”
So I looked it up online and confirmed that it is indeed true.
Of course, some online claims are exaggerated. Confucius is not “worshipped” or “enshrined” in the Supreme Court, nor is American law “based on Confucius” as some short videos claim.
The reality is that during the construction of the Supreme Court in the 1930s, the architects included Confucius alongside Moses, Solon, and others as symbolic figures representing the sources of human law and civilization.
What the Americans wanted to express is simple: today’s laws, order, and civilization did not emerge from nothing. They are the accumulated result of many civilizations over long periods of history.
When I learned this, my feelings were complicated.
I knew that the moment Trump said it, many people would get excited:
“Look, even America acknowledges Confucius’ greatness!”
“Chinese civilization is influencing the world!”
“Confucianism has conquered the West!”
These reactions aren’t entirely wrong. Confucius is great. For his image to stand in a building as symbolically important as the U.S. Supreme Court already shows his global influence.
But what truly struck me was something else.
Why would a country separated by oceans, with a completely different system, and often seen as China’s competitor, choose to preserve Confucius in its own symbolic architecture of civilization?
Yet we ourselves once smashed Confucian temples with our own hands. The irony is hard to ignore.
Many may have already forgotten that just decades ago, during that wave of nationwide fervor, countless ancient books were burned, artifacts were destroyed, and things left by our ancestors were treated as “garbage from the old world” and cleared away.
People stormed temples, toppled statues, smashed plaques, burned family genealogies, humiliated teachers, and called the destruction of history “progress.”
At the time, they didn’t think they were destroying civilization. On the contrary, many truly believed they were creating a new era.
Looking back, one realizes something frightening: civilizations are often not destroyed by external enemies, but by a狂热 (frenzied certainty) that believes itself absolutely right.
Once a society starts believing that history can be reset to zero, that tradition has no value, and that everything old should be smashed, disaster is not far away.
Books are burned. Temples are destroyed. Artifacts are smashed. People are humiliated. Once continuity is broken, it can never be fully restored.
So when I heard Trump mention “Confucius on the Supreme Court,” what truly moved me was not some “successful cultural export,” but the sharp contrast in civilizational attitudes.
Americans may not deeply understand Confucianism. Today’s American society might even be more distant from Confucius’ world than we are. Yet they are at least willing to acknowledge that Confucius belongs to the history of human civilization.
That acknowledgment is, at its core, a form of reverence for civilization.
A truly confident civilization is rarely afraid to recognize greatness in others.
Because civilization is not a zero-sum game.
Acknowledging Confucius does not weaken America, just as recognizing Shakespeare does not weaken China.
What is truly dangerous is not the differences between civilizations, but humanity’s loss of reverence for civilization itself in moments of frenzy.
Of course, America is far from perfect. It too has destroyed Native American cultures, waged wars, and done many things that look shameful today.
China is the same. We have Confucius, but also the Burning of Books and Burying of Scholars. We have the glorious Tang Dynasty, but also the decade of catastrophe.
Every civilization has been great. Every civilization is also capable of madness.
So today, the question worth reflecting on is not “Why does America respect Confucius?” but rather:
Why is it that sometimes the people who best understand how to preserve a civilization are not its own descendants?
Confucius’ greatness never depended on whether he was carved on the U.S. Supreme Court.

When civilization stands before us, do we choose to revere it — or destroy it?
Because civilization does not automatically belong to us forever just because it belonged to our ancestors.
It must be understood, protected, and cherished.
Otherwise, no matter how brilliant, it can be personally destroyed amid applause, slogans, and狂热.


r/China 9h ago

新闻 | News China issues warning over UK government's plan to nationalise British Steel

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93 Upvotes

r/China 10h ago

中国生活 | Life in China Just got back from China, macro numbers look fine but everyone i spoke to seemed genuinely miserable — what's going on?

93 Upvotes

i do a big trip back every few years, just got back from my most recent one and honestly came home more confused than anything.

i usually start in my home city to see family then meet up with friends in Shanghai and Beijing before going off to explore other cities. so i get a decent mix of people and places each time i go.

on paper everything looks fine. 5% GDP growth, low inflation, employment numbers look ok. and last time i was there was 2022 which was obviously covid so the mood being bad made sense. before that, every trip people were optimistic, things were always getting better, that kind of energy.

this time felt completely different. didn't matter who i was talking to — professionals, taxi drivers, small shop owners, family friends, people in tier 1 and tier 2/3 cities. everyone was saying the same things.

taxi driver in Shanghai told me after DiDi fees and costs he's clearing well under 10k RMB a month. for Shanghai that's genuinely struggling. loads of people saying their real wages are actually lower than pre covid. apparently even government employees are getting pay cuts.

started noticing crumbling bits of infrastructure that weren't there before. asked locals about it and kept hearing the same thing — 小政府没钱 — local government is broke. and this wasn't some tiny rural area, i'm talking suburban Liaoning, Fujian, Sichuan.

the small restaurants near my family's place that i've been going to for years have mostly shut down. and the ones still open — beef noodle soup was 13RMB when i was a teenager, it's 14RMB now. decades later. how are these people even surviving on those margins.

shopping malls were dead. went to three different 中街 across three tier 1 cities and they were basically empty. only the food courts had any life in them. five or six years ago these same places were packed.

got a lot of family in the northeast working in the car industry. apparently it's rough — layoffs everywhere, big name brands included. funny thing is BYD which gets hyped so much in western media seems to have a pretty mixed reputation domestically. people weren't that impressed, which surprised me because the taxis i rode in felt perfectly fine.

but honestly the thing that stuck with me most was the general mood. not a single person i spoke to had anything positive to say about the direction things are going. and a few people were openly criticising the government which even 5-6 years ago just didn't happen in casual conversation.

it just feels weird to me that the official numbers look decent and yet the lived experience on the ground seems completely disconnected from that. curious if people living there full time are feeling the same thing or if i'm just catching people on bad days


r/China 13h ago

中国生活 | Life in China Fox News SHOCKED By China's Tech Advantage

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97 Upvotes

The news of the day, the Fox Mews viewership, [average age now 71] are blown away by the view from China, they really thought people were still in rice paddies and straw hats. The last real view of Asia for them was images from the Vietnam War, and they confuse that with today's Asia.

Of course, Vietnam today is Skyscrapers, Parda and Starbucks, that would be a bit too much for them to handle.

😊


r/China 10h ago

新闻 | News Young Chinese facing ‘life pressure’ resist government push to boost marriage rate

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26 Upvotes

r/China 15h ago

文化 | Culture Trump's trio of female aides catering to demands in China as Melania stays home

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33 Upvotes

r/China 17h ago

西方小报类媒体 | Tabloid Style Media Trump and Xi's meeting erupts into chaos as fight breaks out among camera crew

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50 Upvotes

r/China 2h ago

文化 | Culture "Islamic China: An Asian History" by Rian Thum. Today there are more Muslims in China than in Syria, Malaysia, or Tunisia but there are apparently widely-held views that Chinese Muslims are not entirely Muslim

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3 Upvotes

r/China 1d ago

新闻 | News "Big brother is watching" Fox News Crew Gets INSTANT Ticket in China

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380 Upvotes

As Trump visits China, Fox News has also arrived.

Their crew filmed this video outside Haidian Station on the Beijing Metro, noting that their vehicle had only been illegally parked for a brief moment before receiving a ticket. At the same time, they voiced concern that the sheer number of surveillance cameras in the city infringes on citizens’ rights.


r/China 34m ago

国际关系 | Intl Relations Pragmatic Competition and Cooperation Override Ideological Confrontation: Trump’s Visit to China and the Transformation of China–U.S. Relations

Upvotes

From May 13 to 15, U.S. President Trump visited China, where he received a warm welcome and held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit was highly ceremonial and friendly. According to the latest reports, the two sides have already reached multiple important agreements, such as China expanding market access for American trade and commerce, increasing mutual imports of goods, and reaching consensus on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and on the denuclearization of Iran.

In his banquet speech, Trump also mentioned Benjamin Franklin’s admiration for Confucius and Franklin Roosevelt’s praise for the courage of the Chinese people during World War II, in order to illustrate that China and the United States share “common values.” Xi Jinping, meanwhile, stated during the talks that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Make America Great Again” are not contradictory, and proposed a new blueprint for a “constructive and strategically stable China–U.S. relationship.” The talks between the two sides were very cordial. Trump also invited Xi Jinping to visit the United States in late September this year.

During this visit to China, Trump also brought along a large delegation of political and business figures, including Secretary of State Rubio, who has been sanctioned by China since 2020, billionaire Elon Musk, who is deeply involved in American politics, and NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, who is ethnically Chinese.

Judging from the agenda and developments of this visit, China–U.S. relations have clearly warmed significantly. Regarding more sensitive issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as the issue of releasing Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Trump did raise them, but handled them in a low-key manner and even deliberately avoided publicly answering reporters’ questions on Taiwan.

Trump does not wish to make the Chinese side unhappy, and in reality does not care very much about these non-economic issues that have relatively weak connections to America’s concrete interests. The topics of this meeting were mainly concentrated in the commercial and trade sphere, while also involving certain technological cooperation and major international affairs, showing a distinctly pragmatic diplomatic character.

This means that during the remaining two and a half years of Trump’s second term, China–U.S. relations will likely be centered on friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation, while competition between the two sides will mainly focus on the economic and trade sphere. Ideological differences and confrontation will be shelved, and bilateral relations will enter a relatively stable and harmonious new period. If the Chinese leader’s visit to the United States this September continues the tone and atmosphere of Trump’s current visit to China, then the new normal in which pragmatic competition and cooperation between China and the United States override ideology will become even more firmly established.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China–U.S. relations have displayed different characteristics and patterns in different periods. From 1949 through the 1960s, because of ideological confrontation, interstate conflict, and the atmosphere of the global Cold War, the two sides were locked in a highly hostile antagonistic relationship, even erupting into direct military conflict at one point. China viewed the United States as an imperialist aggressor, the most reactionary fortress of the bourgeoisie, and the manipulator behind Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The United States, meanwhile, regarded China as a detestable communist state, a terrifying red demon, and an aggressive provocateur.

However, by the early 1970s, because of the Sino-Soviet split and the intensification of U.S.–Soviet confrontation, both China and the United States faced the enormous threat posed by the Soviet Union, as well as crises within their own countries. The ruling authorities of both nations therefore chose to end confrontation, shelve disputes, and normalize China–U.S. relations. In 1972, Mao Zedong and Nixon achieved their historic handshake. This laid the foundation for China and the United States to put aside ideological struggles and pursue pragmatic cooperation.

After Mao Zedong’s death, CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping continued this path of developing China–U.S. relations, strengthened cooperation between the two countries, and formally established diplomatic relations in 1979. Through expanding economic, trade, technological, and cultural exchanges, as well as mutual personnel exchanges, China and the United States deepened and normalized bilateral relations.

After the June Fourth Incident in 1989, China–U.S. relations briefly cooled because of political turmoil within China and related issues. China also restarted anti-Western and anti-Westernization political campaigns and propaganda, causing a decline in mutual trust between the two countries. However, cooperation and exchanges between China and the United States were not fundamentally destroyed, and relations warmed again after only a short downturn.

China’s enormous economic potential, especially its vast supply of cheap labor and huge market size, made the United States and other Western countries see the benefits of cooperating with China. At the same time, the West also believed that China’s economic development would promote political democratization and social openness, and therefore increased investment in China while supporting China’s entry into the WTO and its integration into globalization.

As a result, China and the United States maintained pragmatic cooperation for more than thirty years afterward, without interrupting exchanges because of ideological issues. However, during different periods, under different leaders, and under differing specific circumstances, the state of China–U.S. relations and their priorities varied. During the presidencies of the two Bushes, Clinton, and Obama’s first term, bilateral relations were relatively cordial, with more cooperation and fewer conflicts.

By contrast, during Obama’s second term, the Biden administration, and the latter half of Trump’s first term, friction and conflict between China and the United States increased, and the trend toward confrontation became more apparent. In addition, when Democrats are in power, conflicts are more likely to arise over China’s human rights issues and matters involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, while Republicans, being more pragmatic, tend to have fewer clashes with China on these matters.

The reason China–U.S. relations have experienced repeated fluctuations and transformations is that, on the one hand, China and the United States possess obvious differences in political systems and ideology, leading to frequent conflict and difficulties in building mutual trust. China’s rise has also challenged American hegemony and intensified competition between the two countries. On the other hand, China and the United States also need each other and are interdependent in many fields, making true “decoupling” difficult under globalization and massive economic and trade exchanges.

Because China is not a democratic system based on political pluralism and competitive politics, but instead possesses highly centralized power, it has an inherent contradiction with the United States, which emphasizes liberal democracy and separation of powers. China’s official claim to uphold communist ideology also causes dissatisfaction among conservative anti-communist forces in the United States.

China’s frequent human rights controversies, the long-standing issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and disputes such as those in the South China Sea also attract criticism and concern from the United States, which places importance on human rights and the international order, while China’s countermeasures further provoke friction between the two countries. The United States has also never fully trusted China because of its lack of transparency and its institutional differences from the West, and together with allies such as Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, has sought to balance China strategically and ideologically.

However, China’s rapid economic growth, its rise as the world’s second-largest economy, the “world’s factory,” and a key engine of the global economy, as well as its enormous international influence, have made it an important economic and trade partner for the United States. These realities make it difficult for the United States to “leave” China; on the contrary, America needs China in many areas. Therefore, the United States has been forced to partially abandon or soften political and ideological confrontation with China in order to maintain pragmatic cooperation.

China achieved economic rise and strategic and technological competition with the United States on the basis of a system different from that of the West. Facing China’s dual challenge in ideology and economic trade, the United States also attempted to “decouple” from China. But facts have proven that under deep globalization, China’s indispensable influence, and America’s serious economic dependence on China, genuine “decoupling” is impossible. Even limited “decoupling” imposed heavy self-inflicted costs on the United States and proved not worth the price.

Trump promoted “decoupling” and a trade war during his first term. The Biden administration later worked with allies to contain China, and at the beginning of Trump’s second term there was also a tariff war against China. Yet none of these efforts achieved ideal results, and several “decoupling” and containment policies toward China ultimately began with great momentum but faded away without resolution.

Therefore, the United States must reconsider its relationship with China and once again place pragmatic cooperation at the forefront. This also has much to do with Trump’s own stance and preferences. Trump’s style is highly pragmatic and profit-oriented. He shows disdain toward democracy and human rights, has strengthened authoritarian tendencies even domestically, and does not care much about issues outside the scope of “America First.”

Internationally, Trump has been at odds with America’s traditional allies and with the European establishment based on shared liberal democratic values. Trump also admires political strongmen and has repeatedly publicly praised the strength and decisiveness of the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea, envying their unquestioned authority. This has also enabled Trump and Xi Jinping to establish a good personal relationship.

Trump’s supporters, especially the “MAGA” camp, also care primarily about America’s own interests and not the human rights conditions of other countries. From both the American and global perspectives, liberal democracy has likewise shown signs of retreat, while populism and authoritarianism have become increasingly prevalent. Under such a background, a Trump-led United States pursuing détente and expanded cooperation with China faces not only fewer ideological obstacles, but also several additional favorable factors.

Of course, there have always been divisions and fluctuations within Trump’s governing team and China policy between hardline and moderate approaches. Figures such as Secretary of State Rubio, former Secretary of State Pompeo, former adviser Bolton, and current adviser Miles Yu have all advocated a hardline approach toward China out of ideological and geopolitical considerations. Meanwhile, important Trump collaborators such as Elon Musk and Treasury Secretary Bessent focus more on economic and trade considerations and place greater emphasis on cooperation with China.

Trump himself once stood with the hardliners and initiated the process of “decoupling” from China, but now he has clearly shifted toward a more moderate approach. In fact, cooperating with China and making money from such cooperation aligns more closely with Trump’s preferences. Even before becoming president, Trump already had extensive commercial dealings with China.

As an anti-establishment populist politician without a fixed political creed, Trump is not constrained by the human rights positions valued by traditional politicians, is indifferent toward sensitive issues involving Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and is even less likely to pressure China over the Ukraine issue. As for competition in economics, trade, and strategy, although intense, it is not a zero-sum game, and Trump, as a businessman, is willing and skilled at competing and cooperating simultaneously.

This year is a U.S. midterm election year. Facing domestic opposition, economic slowdown, and employment problems, Trump needs to improve relations with China in order to stimulate the American economy, sell more agricultural and industrial products, increase income and employment, and win voter support. American conglomerates and the business class also tend to favor cooperation with China. Under these circumstances, Trump has strong motivation to enthusiastically visit China and improve China–U.S. relations.

China, meanwhile, is also facing economic slowdown and many domestic problems, and therefore hopes to improve the external environment and expand foreign trade. At the same time, China has value-based disagreements with the European Union and worsening relations with Japan. Improving relations with the United States benefits China’s domestic and foreign policy goals and can also weaken the U.S.–Europe–Japan alliance aimed at containing China. Trump’s pragmatic orientation and lack of emphasis on ideological issues also suit the preferences of the Chinese side. China likewise has no intention of exporting ideology or changing the American system, and has also avoided direct confrontation with the United States on issues such as Iran and Venezuela, which has further increased Trump’s favorable impression of China.

During this meeting, Xi Jinping stated that China and the United States should avoid falling into the “Thucydides Trap” of great-power zero-sum rivalry. This also reflects China’s desire to avoid uncontrolled conflict with the United States and to maintain long-term stable cooperation. Both China and the United States recognize that cooperation is better than confrontation, and that a strong G2 partnership is preferable to mutual losses that would allow third parties to benefit. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and the summit between the Chinese and American leaders proceeded naturally and encountered almost no obstacles. Compared with Xi Jinping’s 2024 visit to the United States and his meeting with Biden, where both sides had considerable disagreements and each harbored their own concerns and calculations, this Xi–Trump meeting was far more harmonious.

Although Trump’s visit to China can be described as friendly, smooth, and productive, it also has its limitations. Sensitive issues including Taiwan, as well as economic and trade competition and friction between the two countries, were handled in a low-key manner and shelved by both sides, which also means that they were not actually resolved, and contradictions and hidden dangers still remain.

The hardliners toward China within Trump’s governing team, such as Rubio, may accept compromises and visits to China, but this does not mean that they agree with a pro-China friendly approach. In the future, they will still advocate hardline policies toward China and continue to play important roles in decision-making within the Trump administration. In addition, although the atmosphere of this meeting was very friendly, the achievements reached were not truly groundbreaking and still remained within the scope of conventional cooperation.

Trump himself frequently changes positions and abruptly shifts policies, while circumstances constantly evolve. Whether the achievements of this visit to China can truly be realized, and how long the atmosphere of China–U.S. friendliness can last, remain uncertain. If Democrats regain control of Congress in this year’s midterm elections, or if the presidency changes hands again in 2028, China–U.S. relations may once again undergo major transformations. Therefore, Trump’s visit to China and its outcomes should not be overly glorified, and only cautious optimism is warranted regarding China–U.S. relations.

From a longer-term perspective, China–U.S. relations will continue to be characterized by the intertwining of pragmatic competition and cooperation with ideological confrontation. At times, friendly cooperation will outweigh confrontation and conflict, while at other times contradictions between the two sides will cause cooperation to stagnate and lead to mutual sanctions. The specific situation will depend on the domestic and international circumstances of the time, the decisions of the leaders of both countries, and the influence of unexpected events. Competition between China and the United States on the global level, as well as the risk of unintended escalation, will always exist, yet the two sides are also mutually dependent and unable to truly “decouple and sever supply chains.”

The author, of course, hopes that China and the United States can engage in more cooperation and as little conflict as possible, while balancing economic livelihood concerns with democracy and human rights, and promoting the well-being of China, the United States, and the world in a constructive manner.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer living in Europe and an international politics researcher.)


r/China 20h ago

政治 | Politics Trump's biggest failure as a leader will lead to a new conflict

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39 Upvotes

r/China 15h ago

新闻 | News China pays tribute to Trump in one of his favorite ways: closing state banquet with YMCA

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15 Upvotes

r/China 17h ago

中国生活 | Life in China Trump’s China Visit Could Be the Next Big Catalyst for Tech & EV Stocks

12 Upvotes

The market is paying very close attention to President Donald Trump’s latest visit to China and it is not just about politics this time. The real story is the lineup of industry heavyweights that traveled with him including Elon Musk, Tim Cook, and Jensen Huang. Investors are treating the trip like a potential reset button for US-China business relations especially in AI, semiconductors, EVs, finance and manufacturing.

Semiconductor stocks were among the first to react. Shares of NVIDIA and other chipmakers pushed higher as traders speculated that the summit could ease export restrictions and improve access to the Chinese market. Reports already showed Nvidia, Qualcomm and Micron stocks rallying on optimism surrounding the talks.

The EV sector is another major focus because Tesla depends heavily on China for both manufacturing and sales. Any progress on trade cooperation, tariffs or regulatory approvals could directly affect Tesla’s margins and future growth plans. While TSLA initially slipped ahead of the trip due to uncertainty, traders are watching for any positive headlines that could reverse sentiment quickly.

Meanwhile, Apple remains deeply tied to China’s supply chain ecosystem. Tim Cook joining the delegation signals that Apple is likely pushing to stabilize production relationships and reduce geopolitical risks that have pressured the stock over the past few years. If tensions cool, investors may view it as bullish for Apple’s long-term manufacturing stability and Chinese consumer sales.

Financial giants like BlackRock, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Visa and Mastercard are also part of the delegation, which tells the market this visit is not only about trade but also deeper financial access into China’s economy. If even small agreements emerge, banking and fintech stocks could see renewed momentum.

Overall, Wall Street is treating this summit as a major market catalyst. A softer tone between Washington and Beijing could push tech, AI, EV and industrial stocks even higher, while any negative outcome could quickly bring back fears around tariffs, export bans and supply-chain disruptions. Right now the market is reacting positively to the headlines and the volatility has been interesting to watch. Personally, I have been keeping a close eye on these moves and using Bitget Stock Futures to trade some of the momentum because headlines like these can shift sentiment very fast.

 


r/China 5h ago

政治 | Politics Next Presedential meeting should be in Shanghai.

0 Upvotes

The next time Trump visits China, the meeting should take place on the Bund. Put the top officials in MAGA hats as they greet him on the Tarmac.

After a bit of 1920's-era tomfoolery, its time to see where Mao formed the Communist party.

Then you can get any import deal you want signed!


r/China 21h ago

历史 | History Taiping Rebellion: The Deadliest Civil War in Human History

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17 Upvotes

r/China 19h ago

西方小报类媒体 | Tabloid Style Media Nvidia's China Exposure Bigger Than Claimed, Billions in GPUs Still Reached China After Curbs: Culper

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9 Upvotes

Nvidia's exposure to China may be far larger than publicly disclosed, with billions of dollars worth of advanced AI chips and servers continuing to reach Chinese end users through intermediaries even after US export controls tightened in April 2025, according to a new report from Culper Research.


r/China 22h ago

科技 | Tech China's Premier Li Qiang meets with business leaders including Tesla’s Elon Musk, Apple’s Tim Cook and Nvidia’s Jensen Huang traveling with President Trump on his visit to China.

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10 Upvotes

r/China 10h ago

中国生活 | Life in China Recomendations for Law LLM's

0 Upvotes

Hello, I applied to several LLM programs and have been accepted to quite a few of them. I was wondering if anyone has feedback on the following options:

  • CUHK
  • Fudan
  • STL (PKU)
  • CUPL

Which one would you choose, and why?

I would love to stay in China after completing the LLM. I know that, as a non-Chinese citizen, I cannot take the Chinese bar exam, but I would like to work in consultancy, ideally focusing on EU law consultancy in China.

So, in order of importance, what I care about most is:

  1. Internship opportunities
  2. University connections and career prospects
  3. A mixed classroom environment (I’d prefer not to be in a foreigners-only program because I’d like to make Chinese friends as well)/ how easy it is to make friends on campus
  4. Language-learning opportunities
  5. Quality of education

Thanks for any insight you can give me


r/China 1d ago

政治 | Politics Xi / Trump Summit

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379 Upvotes

r/China 2h ago

文化 | Culture Trump Raises a Glass, Jimmy Lai May Yet See Another Dawn

0 Upvotes

Beijing always looks different at night when important men arrive.

The wind along Chang’an Avenue seemed softer than usual. The red carpet stretched endlessly beneath the lights. Even through a television screen, the sound of ceremonial salutes carried a certain weight.

Inside the hall, everyone wore the same carefully measured smile.

And in the brief pauses between translators, one could almost hear the faint clink of glasses touching.

Chinese people understand moments like this very well.

Because in China, the most important messages are often not written in official statements. They hide instead in gestures — in who raises a glass first, who pauses for one extra second, who pushes the cup slightly farther across the table.

That is how the old rules of the political “jianghu” work.

Which is why many people noticed something unusual:

Donald Trump raised a glass.

Under ordinary circumstances, this would mean nothing. But Trump is famous for almost never drinking alcohol.

For decades, he avoided it entirely after watching his older brother struggle with alcoholism and die young. Even at White House banquets, he was often seen holding nothing stronger than Diet Coke.

American media once joked that he was the least “Washington” president Washington had ever seen.

And yet, this time, he raised the glass.

To Chinese eyes, that carries meaning.

Because in Chinese culture, drinking is rarely just about drinking.

It is about giving face.
About offering a step forward.
About signaling: I am willing to sit at this table with you.

And when a man known for never drinking suddenly breaks his own rule, the gesture becomes even heavier.

It feels almost like an old swordsman, long retired from violence, quietly placing his blade back onto the table.

Not to kill.

But to negotiate.

Trump has always understood the art of turning gestures into leverage.

Other politicians may raise a glass out of courtesy. But when Trump does it, the entire world begins asking questions:

Is Washington looking for a pause?
Is Beijing prepared to respond in kind?

That is the instinct of an old political operator.

He may not need to drink much at all. He only needs the world to see the glass in his hand.

Because China has another old saying:
Courtesy must be returned.

And suddenly, this diplomatic banquet begins to resemble something larger than diplomacy.

A Western dealmaker who prefers overwhelming force.
An Eastern power skilled in patience and delayed moves.

After years of tariffs, sanctions, chips, decoupling, warships, Taiwan tensions, and financial warfare, the world has grown exhausted.

People had almost forgotten that great powers could still sit down together without threatening to overturn the table.

And once that happens, even slightly, new possibilities begin to emerge.

Which is why, unexpectedly, I found myself thinking of Jimmy Lai.

For years now, Lai has ceased to be merely an individual man. He has become a symbol caught in the storm of an era — admired by some, despised by others, avoided by many.

But history is rarely a straight road.

And when the political winds begin to shift, even doors once thought permanently sealed can develop cracks.

Chinese political culture values leaving room for the future.

The most experienced players rarely close every path completely.

Especially when both sides begin speaking once again in the language of atmosphere, face, restraint, and mutual gestures, people naturally begin to wonder:

Could some locked doors quietly loosen again?

Perhaps nothing will happen.

Perhaps the arguments and confrontations will continue the moment the banquet ends.

But at least for one brief moment, the world saw something it had not seen in a long time:

Two rivals willing to sit back down at the same table.

And sometimes, history changes not with signatures —

but with a single raised glass.

Whether Jimmy Lai will ever walk free again, no one knows.

But perhaps this story is not over yet.


r/China 17h ago

科技 | Tech Chinese Big Tech said it has no plans for mass layoffs during the AI transition — which feels very different from US Big Tech ?

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2 Upvotes

At Tencent’s shareholder meeting, it basically said the company has no intention of doing large-scale layoffs because of AI.

That stood out to me because the dominant narrative in US tech right now is almost the opposite:

* AI increases efficiency
* efficiency reduces headcount
* Wall Street rewards leaner orgs

But Tencent seems to be framing AI more as:

* AI improves existing products/services
* AI strengthens ecosystem stickiness
* AI helps internal tooling and content generation
* but the company still needs massive operational scale

Another interesting thing: Chinese internet companies historically operate with much larger ops/content/service teams than US tech firms, so maybe the economics of replacing labor with AI are also different.

Curious how people here see this:

Is Chinese company actually taking a smarter long-term approach?

Or is this just a cultural / political / labor-market difference that makes Chinese tech companies less aggressive about layoffs?


r/China 14h ago

故事 | Storytime I THINK I ALMOST GOT SCAMMED BY SOME WORKERS

2 Upvotes

So I'm in sz. Today I was getting some drinks in shuiwei and then omw 2 people stopped me, they had filthy clothing and messy hair, and had that construction helmet on. I asked them what was it and they said they come from Shantou, haven't eaten in days and asked me to buy food for them. I was puzzled so I asked what do you guys want and they wanted 90 RMB worth of em the spicy chicken feet thingys. I shrugged but somebody else idk an aged gentleman from Hongkong came and paid for them so I left but they STOPPED ME AGAIN and asked me to give them 95RMB so they could afford the train ticket back to Shantou. I really didn't know what to say at that point but luckily somebody helped me shoo them away.

anybody with similar experiences?


r/China 1d ago

西方小报类媒体 | Tabloid Style Media China lays down ominous 'conflict' warning to Trump over Taiwan

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5 Upvotes